

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 AMMAN 06465 01 OF 04 081645Z
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEAE-00 SSO-00 SS-15 ONY-00 (ISO) W
-----002834 081955Z /42

O 081623Z AUG 78
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7176

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 06465

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

NEA-VELIOTES ONLY FROM CHARGE

E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, MILI, MPOL, JO
SUBJ: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY
- REQUIREMENTS

REF: A. STATE 198354, B. AMMAN 6144

1. AS PROLOGUE TO RESPONSES BELOW TO YOUR SPECIFIC
QUESTIONS REF A I WOULD LIKE TO OUTLINE THE CONTEXT
OF OUR DRAFTING OF REF B. WHAT WE WERE ATTEMPTING TO
DO IN REF B WAS TO FIT INTO ITS SOMEWHAT ARTIFICIAL
FORMAT THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND THE RATIONALE
PROVIDED THE DEPARTMENT IN OUR TELS 3951, 3952 AND 3953.

2. BASICALLY WHAT WE WERE TRYING TO SAY IS THAT THE
PRESENT SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WHILE ADEQUATE
TO PAST CONDITIONS, IS NOT ADEQUATE TO MEET THE
SITUATION CREATED BY THE PEACE PROCESS AND THAT FOR
THE REASONS OUTLINED EXTENSIVELY IN OUR EARLIER
SERIES OF THREE CABLES AND LISTED IN PARA 1B(1)
AND 1B(2) OF REF B, WE NEEDED TO TAKE A NEW LOOK AT
THE PROGRAM. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THIS IS CORRECT,
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 06465 01 OF 04 081645Z

ALTHOUGH IT OBVIOUSLY RUNS AFOUL OF THE CURRENT
CONGRESSIONAL REALITIES.

3. IN REVIEWING REF B WE AGREE THAT SOME OF OUR
LANGUAGE MAY HAVE BEEN TOO BALD. WE OF COURSE DID
NOT MEAN TO IMPLY THAT LEVELS OF \$120 OR \$130
MILLION WERE NOT PROMOTING ANY SIGNIFICANT

U.S. POLICY GOALS. THEY PROVIDE ESSENTIAL SUPPORT TO OUR GOALS HERE, BUT WE WERE TRYING TO SET THE STAGE FOR NEW LEVELS WHICH RESPOND TO THE CHANGED CONDITIONS OF ASKING KING HUSSEIN TO ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS (WHETHER OR NOT THOSE NEGOTIATIONS TERMINATE SUCCESSFULLY). HENCE OUR REFERENCE IN LEVELS I AND II DISCUSSION TO A VIABLE ROLE IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS ON KING HUSSEIN TO ENGAGE IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE THE WASHINGTON CONTEXT YOU HAVE DESCRIBED IS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT THAN WE HAD ANTICIPATED AND OUR GOALS WITH THE CONGRESS NOW DIFFERENT IN THAT WE WILL BE FIGHTING TO SIMPLY MAINTAIN FY77 LEVELS, WE ARE SUPPLYING BELOW SOME CLARIFICATIONS TO MEET THE SITUATION.

4. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT THE PROGRAM WILL HAVE TO BE RESPONSIVE TO PERCEIVED JORDANIAN NEEDS IF THE PEACE PROCESS CONTINUES AS WE HOPE. THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES WILL BE A KEY FACTOR IN HUSSEIN'S CALCULATIONS ON JOINING NEGOTIATIONS AND WE DO NOT BELIEVE CURRENT LEVELS OF ASSISTANCE ARE GOING TO BE SUFFICIENT TO GIVE HIM AND HIS MILITARY THE ASSURANCES THEY THINK THEY NEED. MOREOVER, THE LEVELS WE PROPOSED WHICH NOW SEEM UNACHIEVABLE ARE BASED ON ACQUISITION OF THE SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 06465 01 OF 04 081645Z

LIST OF EQUIPMENT WHICH THE KING PROPOSED TO SECRETARY VANCE; WE THINK THAT LIST WILL BE A CENTRAL ITEM OF DISCUSSION IN ANY HIGHER LEVEL CONTACTS THE KING WILL HAVE OVER THE COMING MONTHS. THEY WILL NOT DISAPPEAR AS CENTRAL ELEMENT IN FORTHCOMING PERIOD IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT FACT.

5. IN RESPONSE TO PARA 3, REF A, "MODERNIZATION" WAS TREATED AS A RELATIVE TERM. LEVELS I AND II DO, OF COURSE, SUPPORT OUR POLICY OBJECTIVES BY ALLOWING THE GOJ TO MAINTAIN MINIMAL LEVELS OF FORCE IMPROVEMENT. WE VISUALIZED MODERNIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF IMPROVEMENT OF JORDAN'S MILITARY CAPABILITY AS COMPARED WITH THE COMBAT POWER OF ITS NEIGHBORS, IRAQ AND SYRIA IN PARTICULAR. TIME WAS ALSO CONSIDERED AS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN OUR SETTING OF LEVELS, AS WELL AS THEIR IMPACT ON JORDAN'S ABILITY TO ENTER INTO THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS WITH SOME DEGREE OF ASSURANCE.

IF JAF KEEPS SLIPPING BEHIND THOSE COUNTRIES IT

SEES AS ITS MOST LIKELY MILITARY AND POLITICAL
THREATS, THEN IT IS IN EFFECT NOT EFFECTIVELY
"MODERNIZING", OR AT LEAST NOT WITHIN THE
TIME FRAME IN WHICH SHE PERCEIVES HERSELF TO BE
MOST EXPOSED TO DANGER.
- MODERNIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF IMPROVEMENT OVER
EXISTING RESOURCES IS, OF COURSE, INHERENT IN
THE IRANIAN TANK REBUILD PROGRAM. HOWEVER, OTHER

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 AMMAN 06465 02 OF 04 081653Z
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEAE-00 SSO-00 SS-15 ONY-00 (ISO) W
-----033565 102151Z /42
O 081623Z AUG 78
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7177

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 04 AMMAN 06465

STADIS//////////

FACTORS ARE PERTINENT: (1) REBUILD IS UNLIKELY
TO START BEFORE THE SUMMER OF 1979; (2) THE RATE
OF REBUILD IS LIKELY TO BE ONLY 10 TANKS PER
MONTH WITH SOME 280 TANKS NEEDING CONVERSION; AND
(3) JORDAN'S NEIGHBORS ALREADY HAVE TANKS, E.G.,
THE T-62, IN THEIR INVENTORIES THAT ARE SUPERIOR
TO THE REBUILT M48A5, AND ARE CONTINUING TO
ACQUIRE THESE SUPERIOR TANKS.
- TANK CONVERSION ASIDE, JORDAN AT LOWER FUNDING
LEVELS SEES ITSELF SLIPPING FURTHER BEHIND ITS
POTENTIAL OPPONENTS. AT LOWER OR EVEN EQUAL
FUNDING LEVELS THAN THOSE NOW IN EFFECT, JORDAN
SEES PRICES FOR U.S. EQUIPMENT RISING, AND THUS
BEING ABLE TO PURCHASE LESS EQUIPMENT FOR ITS
FORCES, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME HER OLDER EQUIPMENT
IS BEING OVERTAKEN BY THE ADVANCE OF MILITARY
TECHNOLOGY. JORDAN IS THEN IN A SITUATION WHERE
ITS RELATIVE COMBAT POWER IS DECLINING EVEN THOUGH
SOME NEW EQUIPMENT IS BEING ACQUIRED.
- IF SUPPORT LEVELS I AND II ARE CONSIDERED SEPARATE
AND APART FROM THE GOAL OF GETTING JORDAN INTO THE
PEACE PROCESS, EVEN THOUGH SUBJECT TO POSSIBLE PRESSURES

FROM RADICAL ARAB NEIGHBORS, THEN BOTH LEVELS WILL
PROVIDE FOR GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT OF THE JAF IN ABSOLUTE
TERMS, BUT NOT IN RELATIVE TERMS AS COMPARED WITH SYRIA
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 06465 02 OF 04 081653Z

AND IRAQ. BOTH LEVELS, HOWEVER, SHOULD SUPPORT U.S.
GOALS BY PROVIDING TANGIBLE ASSURANCES OF CONTINUED
U.S. INTEREST IN, AND SUPPORT FOR JORDANIAN MILITARY
DEVELOPMENT DURING A PERIOD OF DECREASING MILITARY
ASSISTANCE LEVELS TO OTHER COUNTRIES WORLDWIDE. UNLESS
THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION CHANGES, WE BELIEVE THAT
AT LEVELS I AND II THE JORDAN ARMED FORCES WILL NOT PLACE
UNDUE DEMANDS ON KING HUSSEIN FOR EQUIPMENT FROM NON-
WESTERN SOURCES, AND WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT HIM IN
HIS MODERATE POLICIES.

IN POLITICAL TERMS, THESE LEVELS, DESPITE SEVERE
FUNDING RESTRAINTS, DEMONSTRATE OUR CONTINUED SUPPORT
FOR KING HUSSEIN'S MODERATE POSTURE, OUR SUPPORT FOR
HIS ACTIONS IN CONTROLLING POSSIBLE TERRORIST ACTIONS
MOUNTED FROM JORDAN, AND WILL HELP TO ENSURE THE
STABILITY OF THE REGIME THROUGH THE CONTINUED LOYALTY
OF THE ARMED FORCES. BECAUSE OF OUR OVERRIDING INTEREST
IN THE MAINTENANCE OF A STABLE MODERATE JORDAN,
WE BELIEVE PRESENT LEVELS OF ASSISTANCE SHOULD AT THE
VERY LEAST BE MAINTAINED; ANY REDUCTION WOULD BE
SEEN AS A DIMINUTION OF OUR INTEREST IN JORDAN
BOTH INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY, THAT WOULD HAVE
ADVERSE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS.

- A. LEVEL I. (MINIMUM LEVEL) (30M MAP, 90M FMS
CREDIT, 1.0M IMET)
- UNDER THIS LEVEL, THE GRANT AID PROGRAM WOULD
PROCURE 12 M109A1B HOWITZERS, WHILE PROVIDING SPARE
PARTS TO SUPPORT WEAPONS, COMMUNICATIONS AND VEHICULAR
EQUIPMENT ALREADY IN THE INVENTORY. THE AIR FORCE
PROGRAM WOULD CONSIST OF 4 F-5E AIRCRAFT UNDER GRANT
AID WITH OTHER CONTEMPLATED PURCHASES OF F-5E AND F
AIRCRAFT COMING UNDER FMS CREDIT.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 06465 02 OF 04 081653Z

- THE FMS FUNDING LEVEL WOULD PERMIT THE CONTINUED
FUNCTIONING OF JAF WITHOUT REDUCING OPERATIONAL
EFFICIENCY, PROVIDED THAT THE GOJ CAN SECURE THIRD
PARTY GUARANTORS FOR ITS LOANS.
- UNDER THIS FUNDING LEVEL THERE WOULD BE CUTBACKS
IN PROGRAMMED INVESTMENT EQUIPMENT, BOTH GRANT AID

AND FMS.

- LEVEL I REPRESENTS A REDUCTION IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE FROM PREVIOUS YEARS AND WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE KING HUSSEIN SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH HIS ARMED FORCES IN VIEW OF THE GROWING INFERIORITY OF JORDAN'S MILITARY EQUIPMENT POSTURE VIS A VIS ITS NEIGHBORS.
- FYI: O&M CONSTITUTES ABOUT 25 PERCENT OF THE MAP FUNDING. THE O&M PORTION OF THE FMS FUNDING IS A MUCH LESSER PERCENTAGE.
- B. LEVEL II (45M MAP, 85M FMSCR, 1.6M IMET)
- THIS LEVEL WOULD FUND THE ENTIRE GRANT AID PROGRAM JAF PRESENTED AT JMC. THE PROGRAM IS ALIGNED WITH THE DOLLAR FIGURE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION DOCUMENT AND PROVIDES OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE FUNDS PLUS INVESTMENT ITEMS SUCH AS (12) M109A1B HOWITZERS FOR JAF AND (6) F-5E AIRCRAFT AND (1) F-5F AIRCRAFT FOR RJAF.
- THE FMS CREDIT LEVEL WOULD ALLOW FOR THE PURCHASE OF COBRA AH1S AIRCRAFT AND THE UPGRADING OF NIGHT VISION CAPABILITY OF JAF. IT WOULD ALSO PERMIT JAF TO CONTINUE PLANNING OF THE PROPOSED ARMOR REBUILD FACILITY. THIS FUNDING LEVEL WOULD BE MUCH PREFERRABLE TO LEVEL I. POLITICALLY IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE U.S. IS MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO MAINTAIN LEVELS DESPITE DOWNWARD PRESSURES WORLDWIDE. IT WOULD ONLY BE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 AMMAN 06465 03 OF 04 081702Z
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEAE-00 SSO-00 SS-15 ONY-00 (ISO) W
-----002840 081956Z /42
O 081623Z AUG 78
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7178

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 04 AMMAN 06465

STADIS////////////////////////////////

PARTIALLY RESPONSIVE, HOWEVER, TO SECRETARY VANCE'S MODERNIZATION LIST, WHICH IS UPPERMOST IN KING HUSSEIN'S MIND IF JORDAN IS TO INCUR SERIOUS POLITICAL RISKS IN NEGOTIATIONS OR IF THE SITUATION IN THE AREA

DETERIORATES IN EVENT OF THE FAILURE OF CURRENT
NEGOTIATION EFFORTS.

6. PARA 4, REF A: ROLLOVER PLANNING. THE
JORDANIANS DO ENGAGE IN ROLLOVER PLANNING, REVISING
THEIR REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES FROM YEAR TO YEAR,
USUALLY AFTER US SUPPORT LEVELS ARE KNOWN. SOMETIMES
ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT ARE COMPLETELY DROPPED OR QUANTITIES
REDUCED AS A RESULT OF SUPPORT LEVELS OR CHANGING
EQUIPMENT COSTS. ROLLOVER PLANNING HAS BEEN
PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE IN RJAF, WHERE HAWKER HUNTERS,
C-119'S AND F-104'S HAVE BEEN RETIRED AS NEW AIRCRAFT
BECOME AVAILABLE. THE REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF
COMBAT DIVISIONS FROM FIVE TO FOUR IS A RECENT EXAMPLE
OF THE CHANGING OF JORDANIAN GOALS. JORDANIAN
PLANNING HAS HAD TO BE VERY FLEXIBLE, PARTIALLY
DUE TO THE FACT THAT WE FUND ONLY FROM YEAR-7.9-YEAR
AND DO NOT PROVIDE EVEN FORECASTS FOR OUT-YEARS.
THIRD-COUNTRY SUPPORT HAS BEEN AN UNCERTAIN AFFAIR;
EXAMPLES OF THIS WERE THE CUT OFF OF KHARTOUM PAYMENTS
FROM KUWAIT AND LIBYA AFTER THE EVENTS OF 1970-71

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 06465 03 OF 04 081702Z

WHEN JORDAN CONFRONTED THE FEDAYEEN AND UNDEPENDABILITY
OF RABAT SUBSIDIES. THE EQUIPMENT NEEDS IN OUR CABLE
WERE THESE THE KING BELIEVES HE WILL NEED OVER NEXT
FOUR YEARS TO MEET EXPECTED THREATS.

7. PARA 5, REF A, CONCERNING ANTI-AIRCRAFT
MODERNIZATION. THIS REFERS TO SOME TYPE OF INDIVIDUAL,
SHOULDER FIRED ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE SUCH AS THE REDEYE
OR STINGER IN ADDITION TO THOSE NOW IN-COUNTRY; A
GUN OR MISSILE SYSTEM TO PROTECT FIXED SITES (THEREBY
RELEASING SOME VULCANS FOR THEIR
PROPER USE IN A MOBILE ROLE); AND THE EXPENSES
INVOLVED IN THE INTEGRATION OF ALL EXISTING AIR
DEFENSE SYSTEMS INTO ONE OVERALL ANTI-AIRCRAFT
UMBRELLA. THE LATTER WOULD INCLUDE SUCH THINGS AS
COMMUNICATIONS, RADAR AND ADP LINKS. ALTHOUGH THE
JORDANIANS HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT REDEYES AND
STINGERS ARE NOT RELEASABLE, THEY STILL MUST INCLUDE
THE NEED FOR A WEAPONS SYSTEM OF THIS TYPE AS A
HIGH PRIORITY ITEM IN THEIR PLANNING. WE BELIEVE
JORDAN IS ON THE VERGE OF GIVING UP THE IDEA OF THE
EMERAD SYSTEM BECAUSE OF COSTS, BUT IS STILL LOOKING
FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL PERFORM ESSENTIALLY THE SAME
ROLE FOR CONSIDERABLY LESS MONEY. THE AFOREMEN-
TIONED REQUIREMENTS ARE IN ADDITION TO THE PROGRAMS
FUNDED UNDER THE AIR DEFENSE PACKAGE WHICH WAS
PAID FOR BY SAUDI ARABIA AND WHICH IS NOW

VIRTUALLY TOTALLY OBLIGATED TO THE I-HAWK AND
VULCAN PROGRAM.

8. PARA 6, REF A:

- JORDAN HAS MODIFIED ITS F-5 ACQUISITION PLANS
SINCE REF B WAS WRITTEN. IT CURRENTLY PLANS TO PROCURE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 06465 03 OF 04 081702Z

SIX F-5E'S AND ONE F-5F ON ITS PROPOSED FY79 GRANT
AID PROGRAM AND THREE F-5F'S ON FY79 FMSCR.
FOUR F-5F AIRCRAFT WILL REMAIN FOR FUTURE ACQUISITION,
PROBABLY IN FY80, TO ACHIEVE CURRENT JORDANIAN F-5
FORCE STRUCTURE OBJECTIVES. A HIGHER FUNDING LEVEL
IN FY79 WOULD ALLOW JORDAN TO BUY MORE F-5'S AND
POSSIBLY COMPLETE ITS F-5 PROGRAM.

- JORDAN HAS REPEATEDLY INDICATED ITS NEED AND
DESIRES FOR AN ADVANCED AIR SUPERIORITY FIGHTER OF
THE F-16 VARIETY. ITS PRESENT PLANNING INCLUDES
THE EVENTUAL ACQUISITION OF THIRTY-THREE AIR SUPERIORITY
FIGHTERS. JORDAN UNDERSTANDS THE DIFFICULTIES
INVOLVED IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR SUCH AN
AIRCRAFT, AS DO WE, BUT BELIEVES IT HAS A LEGITIMATE
NEED FOR AN AIR SUPERIORITY FIGHTER AND GIVES EVERY
INDICATION OF INTENDING TO EVENTUALLY PRESS THE U.S.
FOR APPROVAL TO PURCHASE SUCH AN AIRCRAFT. HIGHER
FUNDING LEVELS IN FY80 AND BEYOND ARE NECESSARY IF
THE U.S. INTENDS TO SUPPORT JORDANIAN PROCUREMENT
OF A MORE COSTLY ADVANCED SYSTEM LIKE THE F-16.
- TOTAL F-5E/F OBJECTIVES COULD INCREASE IN NUMBER
IF THE F-16 OR A SIMILAR SYSTEM WERE NOT RELEASED BY
THE U.S.

9. RE PARA 7:

- A. MAJOR RATIONALE FOR THIRD PARTY BACKED
FMS CREDITS IS THAT IT IS THE BEST ALTERNATIVE FOR
PROVIDING LARGE AMOUNTS OF GRANT (TO JORDAN) MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO FULFILL OUR POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS
WITHIN THE SEVERE LEGISLATIVE CONSTRAINTS PUT ON OUR
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. JORDANIANS WOULD PREFER STRAIGHT
MAP GRANT OR ISRAELI-TYPE DEBIT FORGIVENESS, BUT WE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 AMMAN 06465 04 OF 04 081706Z
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEAE-00 SSO-00 SS-15 ONY-00 (ISO) W
-----002846 081957Z /42

O 081623Z AUG 78
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7179

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 AMMAN 06465

STADIS////////////////////////////////

ARE TOLD THESE ALTERNATIVES ARE NOT POSSIBLE.
NEITHER THEY NOR WE BELIEVE FROM THE ECONOMIC POINT
OF VIEW THAT JORDAN SHOULD OR COULD ASSUME FMS
DEBT REPAYMENT OBLIGATIONS ON THEIR OWN (PARTICULARLY
WHEN WE PROVIDE NECESSARY DIRECT BUDGET SUPPORT).
IF LOOKED AT POSITIVELY WE CAN STATE THAT WE HAVE
BEEN ABLE TO ACQUIRE SAUDI BACKING FOR \$150
MILLION PLUS PROBABLY FY 75 \$30 MILLION IN FMS
PROGRAMS AS A RESULT OF THIS PROCEDURE WHICH WOULD
NOT OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE.

- B. YOUR POINT ON BACKLOGGED \$200 MILLION IS WELL
TAKEN BUT WE CONSIDER THIS REMAINS A VALID
PROCEDURE, PARTICULARLY WHEN YOU REALIZE THERE IS
NO RPT NO OTHER WAY TO ACQUIRE HIGH LEVELS OF GRANT
AID FOR JORDAN. MEANWHILE ISRAEL (AID FROM US)
SYRIA (SAUDI AND LIBYAN RE-PAID CREDITS) AND IRAQ
(SELF-FINANCED) CONTINUE TO ENLARGE THEIR INVENTORIES.
JORDANIANS UNDERSTAND THEIR OBLIGATION TO FIND
BACKERS WHO, WE BELIEVE ARE GENERALLY MORE INCLINED
TO FUND FMS CREDIT WITH ITS SMALLER ANNUAL PAYMENTS,
THAN FMS CASH.

- C. PER YOUR QUERY, WE HAVE NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION
THAT SAUDIS ARE PREPARED TO GUARANTEE ANOTHER
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 06465 04 OF 04 081706Z

TRANSFER OF FMS CREDITS. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT
JORDANIANS WILL BE SEEKING (OR MAY HAVE ALREADY
SOUGHT) THEIR BACKING AND RECENT PRELIMINARY
REPORTS INDICATE THAT PRINCE FAHD ON HIS RECENT
VISIT WAS SYMPATHETIC TO FINANCING JORDANIAN
MILITARY NEEDS. JORDANIANS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY
FOLLOW-UP THEIR GENERAL DISCUSSIONS IN COMING PERIOD
WITH LOWER LEVELS OF SAUDI BUREAUCRACY. OTHER ARAB
STATES SUCH AS ABU DHABI ARE ALSO POSSIBILITIES

BUT HAVE GENERALLY PREFERRED TO FINANCE STRAIGHT
CASH GRANT FOR JORDANIAN MILITARY PURCHASES. IF
JORDAN IS UNABLE TO FIND FMS CREDIT BACKERS YOU CAN
BE SURE THE PRESSURES ON US TO FINANCE THEIR MODERNI-
ZATION THROUGH GRANT ASSISTANCE WILL INCREASE, DESPITE
OUR PLEAS OF CONGRESSIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE CONSTRAINTS.

10. HOPE THIS HELPS IN YOUR PREPARATION FOR
SECURITY ASSISTANCE MEETING. SUDDARTH.

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, ANNUAL REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 08 aug 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978AMMAN06465
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780326-1145
Format: TEL
From: AMMAN
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780885/aaaacsxu.tel
Line Count: 450
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: bcf96d66-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: ONLY, STADIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY, STADIS
Reference: 78 STATE 198354, 78 AMMAN 6144
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 05 jul 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1798649
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY - REQUIREMENTS
TAGS: MASS, MILI, MPOL, JO, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbs://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/bcf96d66-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014